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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1271 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LIN RASHIED JONES, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(Crim. No. 2-10-cr-00125-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 24, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Opinion Filed: December 4, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
In November 2009, Appellant Lin Rashied Jones was a passenger in a white 
Acura, when plainclothes officers stopped the car because of its broken center brake 
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light.  Recognizing Appellant as a former arrestee and recent shooting victim, one officer 
drew his gun and ordered Appellant from the car when Appellant began moving as if he 
was hiding a weapon under his car seat.  A machine pistol was subsequently found on the 
floor of the passenger compartment.   
Appellant alleges that the stop and frisk of him and others in the Acura violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
stop the Acura and they used excessive force in executing the stop.
1
  We disagree.  We 
shall affirm the District Court’s suppression ruling. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
Since we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
On November 29, 2009, four plainclothes police officers — Brian Schmitt, Brian 
Martin, Brian Burgunder, and Ronald Freeman — were patrolling the Hill District of 
Pittsburgh in an unmarked police car.  Around midnight, the foursome stopped a white 
Acura owned and driven by James Little for having a broken center brake light.  The 
                                              
1
 Appellant also raises two challenges for the sake of preservation, which we will not 
address at length since Appellant has admitted that they are foreclosed by Supreme Court 
precedent.  The preserved issues are the facial and as-applied unconstitutionality of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Appellant’s sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.  
With respect to this second challenge, we note that the indictment does list Appellant’s 
previous convictions.  Lastly, Appellant challenges the District Court’s refusal to instruct 
the jury on the mandatory minimum sentence of § 922(g)(1).  This challenge is also 
foreclosed by precedent.  As Appellant concedes, it has long been held by the Supreme 
Court that sentencing is exclusive to the trial judge and may not be considered by juries.  
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (quoting Rogers v. United States, 
422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975)). 
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officers gave Little a verbal warning and told him to park the Acura until he could fix the 
brake light. 
 Later on in the night, around 2 a.m., the officers spotted the same white Acura at 
the intersection of Wylie Avenue and Chauncey Street.  Appellant was standing next to 
the Acura and appeared to be adjusting an object in his waistband.  Officer Schmitt 
recognized Appellant and remembered that he had an arrest record and was recently shot 
in the Hill District.  Based on these facts, as well as Appellant’s furtive movements, 
Officer Schmitt was concerned that Appellant was armed.  The officers attempted to 
approach Appellant but, due to traffic, the officers circled the intersection, only to find 
that Appellant and the white Acura had departed. 
 The officers continued their patrol and soon saw the white Acura again, this time 
parked at a Sunoco APlus gas station.  There was one occupant in the car’s passenger 
seat, which Officer Schmitt was unable to confirm as Appellant.  Little then walked out 
of the gas station convenience store, entered the driver’s side and started to drive off.   
 Before Appellant and Little could exit the parking lot, the officers turned on their 
sirens and pulled the Acura over for the traffic violation of having a broken center brake 
light.  Officer Schmitt got out of the police car and approached the Acura.  Appellant, 
along with the front passenger side of the vehicle, was illuminated by both the gas station 
lights and the headlights of the police car.  Officer Schmitt saw Appellant make sudden, 
furtive movements between his legs, which, according to Officer Schmitt, included 
Appellant lifting his body off of the seat and reaching towards the floor of the car with 
his right hand.   
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 Based on his prior training, experience, and knowledge of Appellant’s past arrests, 
Officer Schmitt believed that he was attempting to hide a weapon and pulled his own 
gun.  As Officer Schmitt continued his advance, he shined his flashlight into the 
passenger side compartment and saw that, indeed, the passenger was Appellant and that 
he was concealing a weapon below his knees.  Officer Schmitt then called for two of his 
fellow officers to assist him in removing Appellant from the vehicle and arresting him.  
The officers retrieved a semi-automatic, FMJ machine pistol from the floor of the 
passenger side of the Acura. 
On June 16, 2010, Appellant was indicted for one count of possession of a firearm 
by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  On January 11, 2011, Appellant moved to 
suppress the machine pistol found in the Acura.  On June 22, 2011, the District Court 
denied the motion to suppress.  On July 20, 2011, Appellant was convicted by a jury on 
the one count and subsequently sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment.  Appellant then 
filed this timely appeal. 
 
II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In reviewing a district court’s ruling on the suppression of 
evidence, our review of questions of law is plenary, while we review findings of fact for 
clear error.  United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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III. ANALYSIS 
 The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States protects citizens 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Although a traffic stop is a “seizure” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it has historically been reviewed under the 
reasonable suspicion framework first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  See 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 
392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
A. Reasonable Suspicion 
 In the course of traffic stops, this requirement is met if officers have a reasonable 
suspicion that the stoppee has violated a traffic law.  See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Delfin-
Colina, 464 F.3d at 396-97.  Less demanding than probable cause, reasonable suspicion 
requires that an officer have an articulable basis for believing that the stoppee has 
engaged in criminal activity.  Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 396.  Accordingly, a traffic stop 
is lawful “when an objective review of the facts shows that an officer possessed specific, 
articulable facts than an individual was violating a traffic law at the time of the stop.”  
Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 398; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.  In the course of traffic 
stops, this requirement is met if officers have a reasonable belief that the stoppee has 
violated a traffic law.  See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d at 396.  In 
forming a reasonable suspicion, officers may rely on their own experience and 
knowledge.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 6 
 Here, the white Acura’s broken center brake light was in violation of 
Pennsylvania’s traffic laws and gave the officers reasonable suspicion to make the stop.  
Pennsylvania’s motor vehicle code states that “[e]very vehicle operated on a highway 
shall be equipped with a rear lighting system including, but not limited to, rear lamps, 
rear reflectors, stop lamps and license plate light, in conformance with regulations of the 
department.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303(b).  This statute subjected the Acura’s lights to 
67 Pa. Code § 175.80(a)(9)(i), which states that a vehicle is not up to code if “[a]n 
exterior bulb or sealed beam, if originally equipped or installed, fails to light properly.”  
See Pennsylvania v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 902 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“A center-
mounted brake light is not required equipment under the [motor vehicle code] and 
regulations but, if it is originally equipped or installed, then it must operate properly and 
safely.”) (citing 67 Pa. Code § 175.80).  Under this regulatory framework, Little’s broken 
center brake light gave the officers sufficiently particular reasons to believe that the 
Acura was non-compliant with § 175.80(a)(9)(i) of Pennsylvania’s motor vehicle 
regulations. 
 Appellant argues that Officer Schmitt made a mistake of law in believing that the 
motor vehicle code required that the Acura’s center brake light be functional and that, 
therefore, his suspicion of a traffic violation was unreasonable.  Instead of 67 Pa. Code 
§ 175.80, Appellant asserts that the applicable Pennsylvania motor vehicle regulation is 
67 Pa. Code § 175.66(e), which requires that vehicles have left and right rear brake lights 
but says nothing of center brake lights.   
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Since this is a matter of state law, we must follow Pennsylvania state law on the 
matter.  In Pennsylvania v. Muhammed, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the 
state motor vehicle laws required that center rear brake lights be operational under 
§ 175.80.  992 A.2d at 902.  Further, § 4303(b) requires that the “rear lighting system,” as 
a whole, conform to the motor vehicle codes and regulations — what constitutes the 
entirety of the system can encompass any number of configurations and placements of 
lights, “including rear lamps, rear reflectors, stop lamps and license plate light.”  75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 4303(b).  Appellant’s argument also fails because its application would 
make it superfluous for the statute to speak broadly about the entire lighting system 
conforming to the motor vehicle code only to limit conformity to certain components of 
that system. 
 Accordingly, under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303(b), via 67 Pa. Code 
§ 175.80(a)(9)(i), Officer Schmitt had a reasonable suspicion that the broken center brake 
light violated the motor vehicle code and lawfully stopped the Acura.  
 
B. Officer Schmitt’s Search of the Vehicle 
 In the course of a lawful traffic stop, an officer may pat down the occupants of the 
vehicle and conduct a search of the passenger compartment, if he has a reasonable 
suspicion that the occupants might be armed and dangerous.  See United States v. Bonner, 
363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 
(1983) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977)).  In addition, an officer 
may briefly surveil the interior of a car.  See Bonner, 363 F.3d at 216.  Any weapons 
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found in plain view during a traffic stop may be seized.  See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 374-75 (1993); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980).   
Officer Schmitt’s search of the car was non-invasive because it only included 
shining a light into the vehicle and approaching the passenger side of the Acura.  As 
Officer Schmitt proceeded towards Appellant, the passenger side of the Acura was 
illuminated by Officer Schmitt’s flashlight, the gas station lights, and the headlights of 
the police vehicle, which exposed the machine pistol between Appellant’s legs without 
Schmitt having to open the car door and remove Appellant.  Due to this lighting, a more 
invasive search of the car was not even necessary to reveal the machine pistol between 
Appellant’s legs.  Thus, Officer Schmitt lawfully recovered the machine pistol under the 
plain view doctrine. 
Appellant argues that Officer Schmitt used excessive force in his stop of the Acura 
by drawing his gun because he could have restrained Appellant and secured the machine 
pistol without such extreme force.  The force and tactics used by an officer during a stop 
cannot exceed the amount necessary to ensure the safety of the officer and the 
surrounding public and may not turn the stop into an arrest.  See Bonner, 363 F.3d at 216-
17; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 29; Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  Nonetheless, officers may apply enough force during a stop to neutralize the 
situation of potential danger, depending on the peculiarities of the stop, including whether 
the stoppee poses an immediate threat of harm.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
396 (1989).   
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While the initial stop for the broken center brake light would not have warranted 
display of his gun, the situation changed once Officer Schmitt recalled Appellant’s 
criminal history and observed Appellant making furtive movements as if he was hiding a 
weapon.  From Officer Schmitt’s vantage, Appellant potentially had a gun well within 
reach to pick up and fire at Officer Schmitt, his fellow officers, or innocent bystanders.  
Coupled with Officer Schmitt’s knowledge of Appellant’s prior arrest record and recent 
involvement in a shooting, it was reasonable for Officer Schmitt to fear that Appellant 
would fire any nearby weapon and, in response, Officer Schmitt’s use of his gun was 
commensurate with the threat posed by Appellant.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Appellant’s 
motion to suppress.  Officer Schmitt’s actions were executed within the confines of the 
Fourth Amendment because he had reasonable suspicion that the Acura was in violation 
of the motor vehicle code, the machine pistol was visible in his plain view as he 
approached the vehicle, and his exercise of force during the stop was proportionate to the 
threat presented. 
